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BOOK REVIEWS
Obviously to meet this challenge first year property teachers will
either have to omit some of the material now covered in their already
truncated courses, or they will have to soft-talk their colleagues on the
faculty into letting them add a credit of time to their courses. Incidentally, the soft-talk will be more effective if some of the non-property men
on the faculty can first be induced to look into this book.
Other law schools are trying to meet the challenge by including land
use control materials in second or third year property courses. A few
have set up separate courses or seminars. Not since McDougal and Haber's Property, Wealth, and Land' has such an "unduckable" challenge
been hurled at first year property teachers.
J. H. BEUSCHERt

THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST

POLICY:

ORIGINATION

OF AN

AMER-

TRADITION. By Hans B. Thorelli.* Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1955. Pp. xvi, 658. $8.00.
ICAN

A lawyer, accustomed to find books on current legal problems equipped with "pocket parts," to include the very latest word, is somewhat
taken aback by a book on antitrust law which straightforwardly and unashamedly stops in 1903. Dr. Hans B. Thorelli's book, The FederalAntitrust Policy: Origination of an American Tradition does just this. Yet
it may safely be predicted that this book will be recognized as required
reading for any serious student of antitrust law and lore.
The book, of course, serves totally different purposes from those
which deal with the latest developments in that field;' for it serves to
constitute a new base of departure from which to analyze those developments. Furthermore, the book does not purport to describe what will or
should be the development in the future, unless one may safely extra8. 1948.
' Professor of Law,

University of Wisconsin.
* Dr. Thorelli is eminently qualified for the study he has made. A citizen of Sweden
born in New Jersey, he holds an LL.B. degree, an M.A. degree (Economics, Political
Science and Statistics), a Ph. Lic. in Political Science, and a Ph.D. degree from the
University of Stockholm. He has done graduate work in Northwestern University and
a significant amount of research in many places throughout this country, including the
Department of Justice and the National Archives. He has done much work in the
antitrust field in Sweden and serves as Consultant Economist to the Ad Hoc Committee
on Restrictive Business Practices of the Economic and Social Council of the United
Nations in New York.
1. For example, DIRLAM AND KAHN, FAIR COMPETITION; THE LAW AND ECONOMICS
OF ANTITRUST POLICY (1954).
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polate the events and statistics. The book, then, is primarily historical.
Its principal contributions to the literature of antitrust seem, to this
reviewer, to be these: First, it gives an exceedingly well written and
scholarly synthesis of material not elsewhere available or available only
in widely scattered sources. Antitrust lawyers will be surprised to find
that Dr. Thorelli has uncovered one case which does not appear in the
legal literature. Second, by bringing together materials from many disciplines, the book gives a clearer picture of the early development of the
antitrust concept. At the risk of serious omission, the reviewer would
point to these disciplines represented in the book: Law, Economics,
Sociology, Religion, Politics, Public Opinion, and even occasionally the
natural sciences. The natural sciences' impact on the field of antitrust
takes the form of applying Darwin's notable thesis to the problem of
survival in the economic struggle which surrounds us. If, in fact, the
fittest survive in the economic struggle, one is tempted to fold one's
hands, face the unavoidable, and in a sense let the devil take the hindmost.
One does not legislate against the inevitable.
Third, a restudy of original materials has enabled the author to
challenge some accepted theorems of antitrust. After reading the definitively told history of the administrative policies of the first four presidential administrations following Sherman's enactment, one is unwilling
to oppose Dr. Thorelli's conclusion that if the Sherman Act was weak
in its infancy the fault did not lie with the courts. The Presidents, acting
through their cabinets and particularly their Attorneys General, deserve
any blame that is to be placed.
At this point one might observe the liveliness of Dr. Thorelli's book
by comparing it with the traditional law book on antitrust. Traditionally,
the opinions of the judges, applied of course to the facts in the cases,
constitute the meat of the discussion. The author puts that material in
context, so that behind the case one senses the practicalities of life. Perhaps the case represents merely the unsuccessful investigations performed
by an enforcement agency not provided with ample funds for a complete
job. Perhaps the case would have been more zealously pressed by an
Attorney General not selected from the elite of the corporation bar.
Perhaps different test cases could have been chosen, for one must reflect
on the evaluation of one United States Attorney that a particular case
was "an extremely popular one." Lawyers are familiar with the adage
that hard cases make bad law, but scarcely with a maxim that popular
cases make good law. By putting the materials in context, Dr. Thorelli
is able to suggest certain conclusions as to the efficacy of the Sherman
Act and the relative importance of certain cases construing that act.
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Certain cases, particularly United States v. Addyston Pipe and Steel Co.,'
grow in stature. Other cases lose some of their glamour. Furthermore,
by painstaking research, the author has collated the private suits involving antitrust problems in a much more ample way than has been done
elsewhere.
The complexity of the many detailed facts and conclusions related
by Dr. Thorelli is naturally beyond the scope of analysis of this brief
review. One could not recite the confused and conflicting views toward
antitrust in any shorter form than the author has done, so the book must
speak, for itself. The book is cleverly arranged with convenient summaries and conclusions at the end of each segment . Finally, in the third
and last part of the book, the author draws together his conclusions and
summations. The hasty reader can, therefore, skim judiciously through
the summary chapters and get the sense of the book. By the same token,
persons may select those portions germane to their particular interests.
Each group will find new insights worthy of consideration.
The entire area of government and business is a challenging one,
for it centers around the extent of freedom which exists in our economic
life. But it does not stop there, for if economic freedom is destroyed,
political freedom cannot long survive. Unfortunately, one man's freedom is another's bondage. If one business man is "free" to enjoy the
market without interference, other men are a fortiori not free to compete.
No one, of course, in an environment where freedom has any meaning,
argues that all men are free to monopolize. That is a pseudo-freedom.
But we all defend to the utmost our freedom to compete. Such a freedom is a basic tenet of our economio system. That freedom, though, has
a fault in common with all enjoyable freedoms: it is not absolute. Predatory competition is opposed by the least sophisticated, but this, may be
only after the most sophisticated have identified a particular tactic as
predatory. And the economic effect of a monopoly obtained by predacity
may not differ from a monopoly which results from honest endeavor.
If all trusts were good, or even if all trusts were bad, the problem
of legislating would be simplified. But the classification is not that easy.
Yet effective legislation cannot be limited by the comparative skill of the
legislature to enumerate, and those acting under legislation to vary. One
can readily point to examples of specific statutes being rendered valueless by their very specificity. At this point one may turn with interest
to a particular paragraph from the book. The author writes:
2. 85 Fed. 271 (1898).
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It must be said that the "solution" of the trust problem
represented by the Sherman Act was an elegant one. The complexities of the problem were enormous, its multifarious details
imperfectly known. Rather than attempting the grueling task
of defining once and for all the multitude of forms in which
the evil might appear Congress resorted to a few concise phrases
of exceedingly broad significance. The beauty of the solution
lies in the fact that these phrases had long since taken on a
certain concreteness of meaning at common law and that in applying this act the federal courts could be counted upon to make
use of that certain technique of judicial reasoning characteristic
of common law courts. Aware that the modes of restraint will
vary considerably from one industry and period to another,
Congress thus deliberately provided for a certain degree of
flexibility in the law.' (Emphasis added.)
One should note that the word certain appears three times in the quoted
paragraph. Once it means fixed or settled (that is, a settled concreteness), then the word seems to mean thoroughly established (as describing judicial techniques), and finally it seems to specify as a "certain
degree." But is this the type of certainty required in the solution of a
legal problem? Or rather should a business man have a specific, certain
(now in the sense of clear and indubitable) guide to his conduct. Perhaps here again the viewpoints of the economist and the lawyer may be
expected to differ.
Monopoly has, as Dr. Thorelli's book demonstrates, not always,
meant the same thing to all users of the term; economists and lawyers
rarely agree on its meaning. Similarly, the element of "intent" to monopolize is far more significant to the lawyer than it is to the economist.
And it may well be that the lawyer sees the need for particular guidance
for his clients, rather than for a general statute of broad meaning which
may catch his clients as a trap for the unwary. Stated differently, does
the Rule of Reason not give Sherman a broad coverage at the expense
of certainty which only an enumeration of certain per se violations can
produce? Is the "certainty" of our present law as ambiguous as the word
"certain" in Professor Thorelli's paragraph? Certainly that question
was not answered in 1903, and it is not definitively answered yet. But
one may well pay homage to the judicial minds which have at least made
workable to date a statute worded so broadly as to apply to such diverse
fact patterns as a partnership agreement between two corner grocers or
3. P. 571.
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to the W.C.T.U. If the statute has been an elegant one, the courts have,
it would seem, acted elegantly.
One may only hope that the author's work will not cease with the
completion of the present thesis. The work ahead of him would seem
to be more onerous than the work he has completed, yet certainly the
years since the period covered by his study are greater in current interest.
The Sherman Act itself has been supplemented, or "as some would say,
mutilated," 4 by many subsequent statutes, special and general. The background and effect of those statutes is surely as important as those of
the Sherman Act. The study has, in short, just begun.
RICHARD COSWAYt

UN: THE FIRST TEN YEARS. By Clark M. Eichelberger.*
York: Harper & Brothers, 1955. Pp. xii, 108. $1.75.

New

James T. Shotwell characterizes UN: The First Ten Years as a
study "of the most challenging political institution of our time, or, for
that matter of any time."' The book is not intended to be a detailed history of the United Nations. The author instead has aimed "to present
in a few bold strokes a picture of the development of the United Nations
against the background of the major crises with which it has had to
deal. ' 2 He wishes his readers to "see the United Nations as an evolving
international society in which the American people and their government
must play a very important part."' In the opinion of the reviewer there
can be no doubt that the author has succeeded in his aim. Eichelberger's
book is a good antidote to such books as The U. N. Record: Ten Pateful
Years for America by Chesly Manly. In Manly's opinion the United
Nations has failed to attain its purpose, has no moral authority because
4. Dorr, Philosophy of the Sherman Law, Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of
the Section of Anti-trust Law, American Bar Association, Philadelphia, 1955, at page 14.
t Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati.
* The author of this book has been concerned with problems of international organization for over thirty years. From 1922 to 1928 he was a lecturer of international affairs. He served as Midwest Director of the League of Nations Association
from 1929 until 1934 when he became National Director of the group. After the formation of the United Nations he occupied a similar position with the American Association
for the United Nations. He was a consultant with the State Department in 1942 and 1943,
and a consultant to the American delegation at San Francisco when the Charter of the
United Nations was formulated.
1. P. xi.
2. P. ix.
3. P. ix.

